Function allocation is a central component of systems engineering and its main aim is to provide a rational means of determining which system-level functions should be carried out by humans and which by machines. Such allocation it is assumed can take place early in design life cycle. Such a rational approach to work design sits uneasily with studies of work practice reported in the HCI and CSCW literature. In this paper we present two case studies of work in practice. The first highlights the difference between functional abstractions used for function allocation decision making and what is required to make those functions work in practice. The second highlights how practice and technology can co-evolve in ways that change the meanings of functions allocated early in design. The case studies raise a number of implications for function allocation. One implication is that there is a need for richer representations of the work context in function allocation methods. Although some progress has been made in function allocation methodologies, it is suggested that the method of Contextual Design might offer useful insights. A second implication is that there is a need for better theories of work to inform function allocation decision making. Activity Theory is considered as a possible candidate since it incorporates a cultural-historical view of work evolution. Both Contextual Design and Activity Theory challenge assumptions that are deeply embedded in the human factors and systems engineering communities. In particular, that functions and tasks are an appropriate unit of analysis for function allocation.
Introduction
Function allocation despite its difficulties and critics (Fuld 1997 ) is still regarded by many as an essential component of the procurement, development and design process, particularly in safety critical, and defence related applications (Corbridge and Cook 1997; MOD 1989) . Viewed as part of a systems engineering process, function allocation is concerned with determining the distribution of work between humans and machines early in design process, well before prototypes or even design specifications have been produced. Most approaches to function allocation endeavour to provide a formal and rational method for making allocation decisions.
. In addition, the high cost of human-machine interface prototypes in such large scale engineering projects means that major re-allocations of function as a consequence of user feedback from prototyping need to be avoided.
This rational approach to function allocation sits uneasily with current research in humancomputer interaction (HCI) and computer-supported cooperative work (CSCW). Such research has convincingly argued the need to better understand work practice in order to design effective systems. Part of this argument is that function-based work representations such as hierarchical task analysis, organisational flow charts, standard operating procedures, etc., seldom adequately represent the complexities of work as practiced. Consequently design decisions based on such abstractions lead to less than ideal design. This has led many in both the HCI and CSCW communities to question the effectiveness of a formal approach to design, uninformed by studies of work practice and lacking in input from users (Greenbaum and Kyng 1991; Schuler and Namioka 1993) .
In recent years the authors of this paper have conducted a number of studies of work practice and we have also developed methods to support design decision making in a systems engineering environment. These methods have included a function allocation method ; and this volume) and a method for human error assessment (Fields, Harrison and Wright 1997) . Our simultaneous involvement in these two very different approaches to design has led us to think about the relationship between design representations and work practice. In this paper we wish to present some findings from studies of work practice and explore what implications these findings have for rational approaches to function allocation. With a mixture of case studies and literature review we will make two claims about work practice and explore their implications for function allocation decision making. The claims are as follows:
1. Function-based representations of work of the sort generally used in function allocation decision making under-specify what is required of humans to make those functions work in practice.
2. Work practice evolves around technology and technology is changed by work practice. Such co-evolution of work and technology can change the meaning of functions allocated to both humans and machines.
The implications of the first claim for function allocation decision making are that function allocation methods need to consider the richer context of work as part of their decision making process. The implications of the second claim are more challenging and may require a fundamental re-consideration of the scope and limits of function allocation as a design philosophy.
Our arguments to support these claims rest on the concept of articulation work introduced by Strauss (Strauss 1985; and developed by others (Gerson and Star 1986, Schmidt and Simone 1996) . In section 2.1, we introduce the concept of articulation work and review some studies of work practice. In section 2.2, we describe one of our own design case studies. This case study is intended to highlight some of the limitations of function allocation decision making if articulation work is not taken into consideration. In section 2.3, we take the concept of articulation work further and review literature on what we refer to as the co-evolution of technology and practice. In section 2.3.1, we consider a second case study which demonstrates how co-evolution can change the meaning of functions in practice and so invalidate function allocation decisions made early in design. In section 3, we will go on to discuss some recent approaches to function allocation and assess the extent to which they address the issues raised by studies of work practice. In section 4, we consider the implications of studies of work practice for further developments of function allocation methods and concepts. In section 5, we draw some conclusions about function allocation.
Studies of work practice

Studies of articulation work
At the heart of many if not all approaches to function allocation is the assumption that functions can be distributed among the humans and machines constituting a to-be-designed system in order to produce a division of labour that is in some sense optimal for that system. Generally speaking optimality is assessed by determining on a function-by-function basis, the relative effectiveness of different divisions of labour. This process assumes that that the functions so divided are inherently independent or any dependencies that do exist can reasonably be ignored at this stage of design. Schmidt and Simone (1996) identify a similar set of assumptions underlying the development computer-based systems in general. They point out that although many such systems are intended for use in collaborative work settings, the underlying representations of work structures do not incorporate models of how such functions distributed across people and artefacts are integrated, coordinated and managed. Yet such management and co-ordination can itself constitute significant work, a type of work referred to in the literature as articulation work (Strauss 1985; . The word articulation is used here in the sense of act or mode of joining 3 . In Strauss' original papers, articulation work referred not only to the interactive processes of training, persuasion, negotiation, and coercion which contribute to a dynamic division of labour in working teams, but also to the divisions of labour achieved through the prescription of standard operating procedures and other organisational artefacts. Schmidt and Simone (1996) point out that the mechanisms by which articulation work is achieved are often complex and subtle and also bound up with the particulars of work settings and technology. Such coordination mechanisms range from the use of 'out-louds' and overhearing to the use of Kanbans and other physical artefacts for controlling workflow. The literature reporting studies of work practice are replete with examples and some representative studies are described below. Heath and Luff (1992) studied teamwork in a London underground control room. In that study the emphasis was on the role that over-hearing and 'out-louds' played in keeping other members of the team aware of the state of the system. In one case they describe how by over-hearing a controller slow down a train, another member of the team was triggered to make a passenger announcement. Similar findings have been made in the domain air traffic control. For example, Marti and Palmonari (in press ), revealed the way in which over-hearing can support coordination even in a physically distributed team. In one scenario, they describe how the controller has to manage three aircraft approaching Rome airport. Through the broadcast communications taking place over the VHF radio channel, the pilot of the first aircraft understands that he is part of a potential loss of separation. Unprompted by the air traffic controller he offers to increase his speed. In another example, this time from inside the cockpit of a commercial aircraft, Hutchins and Klausen (1991) show how the overhearing of one crew member's communications with air traffic control, in conjunction with prior knowledge of route plans, allows the second crew member to correct the errors of the first.
The above examples show how public utterances can provide a simple yet powerful coordination mechanism for articulation work. Other studies have shown how similar support can be gained from information made public in shared physical artefacts. Martin, Bowers and Wastell (1997) , in their study of an ambulance control room, showed how monitor screens which display the status of ambulances and calls could be used by ambulance dispatchers and supervisors in order to gain a mutual awareness of the state of each other's work. Supervisors could then dynamically re-allocate jobs to other less busy dispatchers. Similar studies in the air traffic control rooms have pointed out the importance of flight control strips as shared artefacts supporting workload awareness and dynamic re-allocation of tasks. (Bentley et al 1992) .
The studies described above demonstrate the often dynamic way in which working divisions of labour are established and maintained in practice. In some safety critical and defence applications however, a great deal of design effort is dedicated to minimising such working divisions, particularly in highly critical phases of the activity in question. In settings such as the aircraft flight deck for example, humans are prescribed well defined roles such as flying pilot, non-flying pilot and engineer. In addition, what each individual is required to do in response to life-threatening situations is laid down in standard operating procedures. Strauss (1988) argues that such rationalisation of work is itself articulation work but in this case the articulation is done once and for all rather than on each occasion of use. Indeed it is precisely this precomputation of what should be done and by whom that designers argue reduces the likelihood of collaboration failure in these life-threatening situations (Hutchins 1995a) . But a number of recent studies of work practice in such settings has shown that the following of procedures itself involves articulation work, this time articulation work aimed at getting the procedures to work in practice. Suchman (1987) argued that instruction following is not a matter of literally following a prescribed plan. To quote from Suchman: " ...an instruction's significance with respect to action does not inhere in the instruction, but must be found by the instruction follower with reference to the situation of its use." (Suchman 1987, p. 61) In this regard, Orr (1997) investigated the work of photocopier repairers and of particular relevance to our discussion here, examined the role that "directive documentation" plays in supporting their activity. Directive documentation is issued to all repairers and among the many other things it contains is a description of diagnostic test for use when trouble-shooting. Each action in a test is described in detail and each branching condition is presented as a simple yes/no choice. The aim is to transform the work of trouble-shooting into a simple procedure following activity. Orr points out however, that the actual question to which one is required to respond with a yes/no answer is itself highly convoluted and requires considerable expertise to understand. Button and Harper (1993) describe a case study in which the normal accounting functions associated with a manufacturing process often had to be ignored by workers in order for them to meet contingencies such as rush orders. Button and Sharrock (1994) also observed how functions enforced on design teams using the SSADM methodology are 'made to work' in practice by those using them. Such making to work involved short cutting steps in the process and patching up the account afterwards. Finally, in a study of procedure following in a commercial airline cockpit, Wright, Pocock and Fields (1998) analysed hand-written annotations found in a procedure reference manual. They showed how these annotations give some insight into the kind of knowledge that is required by practitioners in order to follow the procedures effectively. For example, 38% of the annotations were concerned with providing a rationale for why the procedure is the way it is. A further 26% of the annotations concerned actual modifications to the actions of the procedure. Other classes of annotations reflect needs on the part of the worker to have more information about the situations in which they will be expected to use these pre-planned sequences.
The studies reviewed above highlight three themes that emerge from the work practice literature. The first is that divisions of labour are often dynamically re-allocated on the basis of local contingencies on an occasion of practice. The second is that the processes by which such working divisions of labour are achieved are a significant component of that work. The third themes is that even where divisions of labour are pre-computed and reified in such mechanisms as standard operating procedures, there is still work to be done in making those procedures work. These three themes speak to the importance of articulation work as an accomplishment in practice. The following section brings these three themes together in a single case study relevant to function allocation decision making.
A case study of articulation work and its impact on function allocation
This case study is concerned with issues centred on the design of a new maritime search and rescue aircraft. The existing aircraft had a flight-deck complement of three-two flying officers and a flight engineer. The function allocation issue in this case study concerned the implications of reducing that crew complement to two by automating the role of the flight engineer. Commercial flight deck experience suggests that such automation is entirely feasible from a technical point of view. Such a design solution would be low risk and low cost involving commercial off-the-shelf hardware. Our specific role in this was to assess the human reliability implications of such a design solution but our findings speak quite directly to the more central issue of function allocation and exemplify the implications of work practice for function allocation.
The method we adopted for the case study was to engage designers, pilots and flight engineers in a scenario generation exercise. The group was asked to generate a scenario based on their experience of work practice that would challenge a conventional crew while remaining a realistic scenario for a possible automated future system. The details of the case study are presented below.
The scenario
The proposed design will be flown by two pilots supported in their work by modern electronic information displays, similar to those on civil airliners. These show status information, system pages, warning information and procedures to be carried out in response to the warnings (the details of some of these will be discussed later). The operational requirements for this aircraft however, differ markedly from those of an airliner. One example is that the mission may require the aircraft to fly at low altitude over the sea for significant time periods. Another aspect is the requirement to remain on task for long periods, resulting in fuel saving strategies like operating on only three engines, and continuing with a mission even if the aircraft has suffered minor failures. Consequently, the scenario generated by the team is as follows:
The aircraft is at low level (200 feet, during the daytime) over water, photographing a fishing vessel. In order to conserve fuel, the aircraft is flying on only three engines: numbers 2, 3 and 4
4
. The aircraft suffers a massive bird strike on the side with two running engines (it is common practice, under certain conditions, when making a pass to photograph a boat, to present the side with two running engines to the boat). As a result of the bird ingestion in engines 3 and 4, both these engines fail, producing engine failure and engine fire warnings. The engine problems will cause the failure of the generators in these engines which will in turn, lead to the remaining generators being overloaded, resulting in a series of warnings or cautions being signalled after a short delay.
This scenario represents a significant failure management challenge not only for the flight engineer but also the rest of the flight-deck crew. The primary problems (the engine failures) have a number of knock-on effects, leading to secondary warnings. One such example is the failure of generators connected to the failed engines, and the subsequent partial loss of power. The loss of the power will almost certainly result in generator failure warnings and generator overload warnings for the remaining generators, creating the need for electrical load to be shed. In an automated system, the automation will attempt to do this by shutting down non-essential equipment (e.g. in the mission systems area). In practice however, the crew may elect to shut down only certain equipment that is known to be unnecessary from the point of view of the mission at hand while leaving intact the power supply to systems that are judged more important. The details of these decisions will depend on the details of situation at hand.
The primary concern of the crew in a situation such as this will be to take some immediate actions in order to keep the aircraft flying. Only then will then commence the drills in response to the engine fire/failure and any other secondary warnings that might occur. The immediate response in order to keep the aircraft in the air will follow the following prioritisation: power; drag; trim; engine restart outlined in table 1.
Power
Maximum throttle on the remaining engine (2).
Drag Adjust
Trim From one side to the other.
Engine Restart
No. 1 throttle forward past the trigger point -Autothrottle / FADEC starts the engine. While this is going on, the pilot flying will attempt to gain altitude, though a single engine may not be sufficient to climb or maintain the current altitude; hence the importance of restarting the number 1 engine. After these actions have been carried out, the crew will begin to carry out the engine fire and failure drills. Both consist of a combination of immediate actions and subsequent actions. Typically, the immediate actions for all the current warnings will be carried out before proceeding to any of the subsequent actions. As an example, the engine fire drill, in roughly the form it appears in the Flight Reference Cards, is shown in A number of possible variations on this scenario were described to us, depending on the particular situation in which the failure occurred. For example, proximity to high ground may make the activity of navigating safely away from the area is rather more critical and complex. In addition, the drills, even if carried out correctly, can fail to be effective in a number of ways. For example, it is entirely possible that the fire extinguishers will not be adequate to put the fire out; the crew may be unable to restart the number 1 engine; the aircraft may be heavy, and therefore unable to gain altitude.
Discussion of the scenario
The scenario highlights four themes that relate to our earlier discussion of articulation work.
Dealing with the problem involves many functions
An over-simplistic characterisation of the work of fault management in complex systems is that a single problem (e.g. engine failure) is associated with a single recovery procedure (e.g. shut down failed engine). In fact, complex systems are complex because they are constituted of many tightly coupled sub-systems. Failure in one system has knock-on effects in others. The interviews for case study 1 revealed a complex relation between the problem, the relevant drills and the work that was required of the crew. The drills used for dealing with the emergency scenario are themselves fairly simple but to deal with the problem effectively requires the use of a number of different procedures concurrently. For example, engine 2 fire drill, engine 3 restart, generator failure, blue hydraulics failure and so on.
Prioritisation is essential
The scenario requires fast action and a key skill of the crew is to decide how to prioritise relevant procedures associated with a number of different and conflicting top level goals distributed amongst the crew. For example, dealing with engine fires by idling engines versus maintaining power in order to gain height. Such prioritisation decisions need to be informed by contingencies of the particular occasion of use such as weight of the aircraft and height above sea, proximity to land and so on. Because the information is distributed among crew members this activity may require significant communication.
Prioritisation leads to fragmentation
Partly because of the prioritisation issue, procedure following is fragmented. Part of one drill will be executed and then put on hold while another is partially executed or perhaps completed. This interleaving means that the crew need some way of remembering where they are in a complex, multithreaded activity sequence. The aircrew we interviewed described the quick reference handbook as "a good system, because you can flick from one drill to another, you can do as much of one drill as you want then go to another". But in order to use the quick reference handbook in this way, they additionally need a deep knowledge of the physical systems they are interacting with in order to judge where in a procedure it is safe to break off.
Fragmentation and prioritisation are articulation work
Much of the information required to prioritise functions such as gain altitude and shut down engines is distributed among crew members and consequently requires significant communication between them. Once such high level priorities are negotiated, the procedures themselves will literally be articulated at appropriate points. For the crew, keeping track of where they are in this process is a non-trivial matter. Thus what we see when we consider the practice in this scenario is articulation work not only between crew members to achieve a dynamic allocation of tasks but also by individuals as a means of making standard operating procedures work on particular occasion of use.
Implications of this case study for function allocation
This case study illustrates that the implementation of functions in practice requires work of a sort which is not represented in the functional descriptions themselves. There is a gap between functional abstractions of work of the sort used to inform function allocation decision making and the processes that are required to make those functions work on an occasion of use. These processes which we have collectively referred to here as articulation work are what are necessary for people to make a division of labour work in practice. But articulation work is not explicitly represented in the functional abstractions most commonly used in function allocation decision making. Thus given we are making allocation decisions on an incomplete view of the work, our ability to design an effective division of labour is compromised.
In this case study, if our designers had made allocation decisions without reference to the detailed description of work, there would have been strong arguments for automating many of the functions described in the scenario. For example, the function of shutting down the engine is highly proceduralised and therefore easy to automate. If a human has to perform the function it may impose high workload which could be reduced with automation. In addition, an automated system is less likely to make an error during execution of this safety-critical function. But the scenario shows that engine shutdown can be hazardous in some circumstances. The decision whether or not to give priority to engine shutdown needs to be made in the context of other priorities which emerge on a particular occasion of use such as the need to maintain power.
Studies of the co-evolution of technology and practice
The previous sections have used the concept of articulation work to illustrate the gap between functional descriptions of a system and the work that is required to make those functions work in practice. On the one hand we have seen articulation work dedicated to achieving a working division of labour between individuals, on the other hand we have seen the articulation work that is involved in making standard operating procedures work in practice. Our second claim derived from studies of work practice requires us to examine the use of automation in practice. Automation is the result of function allocation decisions and it might be assumed that it would fit seamlessly into the division of labour that results from the function allocation process. Yet there are many observations of work practice that indicate that is not always the case.
Berg (1997) studied the use of decision support systems in health practice. He found examples of practitioners having to tinker with the data which they were required to input to expert systems in order to get it to produce the right outcome such as avoiding sending home patients who looked gravely ill. Bulfer and Gifford (1996) , report how pilots sometimes have to deliberately input incorrect data about tail winds to flight management systems in order to make the system comply with air traffic control clearances. These examples point to the fact that automation designers sometimes fail to take account of the multiple, often conflicting goals that arise in work settings which in turn forces operators to work around the technology. Such an argument strengthens our claim that function allocation needs to be informed by richer representations of work. But the following case study speaks to a much deeper problem with function allocation as a concept. Namely that evolution of work practice around automation can change meaning of the functions allocated to it.
A case study in the co-evolution of technology and practice
In this second case study we were concerned to analyse the impact on human reliability that certain types of automation might have. The particular design problem we were concerned with was the case of flap and slat adjustments during take-off and landing. Flap and slat extension and retraction on a commercial aircraft is very important to the safety of the aircraft during take off and landing. Hutchins (1995b) describes how during an approach to land, an aircraft must slow down to achieve a safe speed for landing but as speed is lost, so the aircraft loses lift and could stall. Extending flaps and slats solves this problem. These change the shape of the wings providing more lift at slower speeds. But the speed at which flaps and slats can be extended is critical, flying too fast with flaps and slats extended can damage the aircraft.
In many conventional aircraft the task of extending and retracting flaps and slats is allocated to the pilots and this is known to be an error prone activity. As a consequence, a number of design features have evolved which support the pilot in this task. For example, Hutchins (1995b) describes speed bugs which are small indicators that can be set to various positions around the outside of the air speed indicator in order that pilot can see at a glance the safe speeds for particular flap and slat settings. Nevertheless errors do occur as the following extract from a confidential pilot incident database illustrates (CHIRP 1983):
After T/O I carried out the usual checks. Brakes, U/C up, PAX notices off etc. … At 1500 feet I noticed the flaps were retracted, I thought John had retracted them early. Usually the flap is retracted at 2000 feet plus in VFR or 3000 noise abatement. Almost immediately he mentioned that the flaps were retracted. 'Oh, I see you have brought the flaps in" he said. "No" I replied "I haven't touched them". He said he hadn't either. Shortly after this he noticed the U/C was still extended. I raised it at 220 knots. There can be no doubt I raised the flaps instead of the U/C after take-off. (CHIRP 1983, p. 3) What this incident describes is a pilot who inadvertently activated a flap retraction lever rather than an undercarriage retraction lever. On this type of aircraft, these two levers are in close proximity and have a similar look and feel making a mis-selection possible. The authors have heard reports of pilots modifying these levers to make them feel different in order to avoid the problem. Norman (1988) also shows a number of examples from the process control industry of the way in which knobs and levers are modified by their users in order to avoid the type of misselections illustrated in the above extract.
In further discussions with aerospace designers it was pointed out to us that in many modern commercial aircraft, the unreliability of humans with regard to the function of flap and slat retraction has been recognised and an automated function has been introduced as second line of defence. During take off, the pilot is still required to operate the flaps and slats manually but in order to prevent a stall, the automated function will inhibit flap retraction for certain values of airspeed and angle of attack. If the pilot commands flap and slat retraction outside of the safe envelope, the automation will inhibit the actuation until a safe airspeed and angle of attack is attained. The details of the automation which the designers described are such that the pilot can move the flap and slat lever into the appropriate position even when the aircraft is still outside the safe envelope, but the function will not be activated until that envelope is entered. According to the designers, this design feature offers a novel opportunity for the pilots to optimise their practice. Instead of operating the controls when they have entered the safe envelope, pilots can now command flap and slat retraction much earlier and rely on the automation to get the timing right. From the pilots' point of view, this improves safety since it saves them having to remember to carry out the function during a high workload and error prone time just after take off.
What has this change in practice meant for the designers of the automation? What it means is that a function that was allocated to the human with automation as a second line of defence against inappropriate operation, has been transformed to an automated function with only marginal human back-up. The function is still achieved effectively, however the primary responsibility for the function has migrated through practice from the human to the technology. In this process of migration, the very meaning of the automated function has been changed.
Instead of being an error-prevention device and a safeguard, it is now a primary actuating and decision making mechanism. Such a change in the meaning of the automated function could have unexpected design consequences. If the designed reliability levels for the automated functioned were premised on the assumption it would be only relied upon in the event of a human error, then any safety argument that was made for the system might be compromised by the unplanned migration of function.
The case study of flaps and slats is not an isolated incident. Other examples of similar changes to meaning of functions have been reported. For example, two recent incidents on the London underground are reported by Neumann (1995) :
"London underground train leaves without its driver. On April 10, 1990, an Underground train driver broke the golden rule of never leaving the cab of a fully automated train; he was checking a door that had failed to close properly. The door finally shut and the train automatically took off without him-although there was no one to open the doors at the next station (he took the next train), As it turned out, the driver had taped down the button that started the train, relying instead on the interlock that prevented the train from starting when the doors were open. Indeed the risks of this shortcut were probably not evident to him.
A very similar even was reported on December 2 1993, when a driver improperly left his Piccadilly Line train when the doors did not close. The train took off with 150 passengers, and went through the Caledonian Road station without stopping. The train finally stopped automatically at a red light and was boarded by personnel following in the next train (Martyn Thomas SEN 19,2,2)". (Neumann 1995, p. 53) Underground trains have two separate controls, one for closing and opening doors and one for starting the train. The controls are designed such that the activation of the start control is ineffective until the door close control has been activated. This forces the driver to make two separate actions in the prescribed order. This allocation of two functions to two separate controls has an obvious safety purpose, it means that the train cannot leave without doors closed and a driver in the cab. By taping down the door control lever, the drivers had optimised one aspect of their activity so as to require only the single action of activating the start control. But in so doing, they had negated the meaning of this allocation as a safety mechanism.
We refer to the way in which technology changes practice which in turn changes the meaning of technology as the co-evolution of work and technology. Such intelligent modification of work settings to optimise human-machine interaction illustrates a different kind of articulation work to that described in case study one. Our first case study highlighted the need for richer representations of work practice to support function allocation decision making. Our second case study adds an extra challenge to function allocation methods. Not only do we require a means by which we can represent the richness of work practice early in design, but we also require a means of considering the ways in which the relations between technology and practice could change over time.
Articulation work and current function allocation methods
The previous section has provided support for two claims. Firstly, that there is more involved in making functions work in practice than is typically represented in function allocation decision making. Secondly, that the relations between humans and technology in a work setting is not static but co-evolves in ways which change not only the work practice and the technology but also the meanings (or purpose) of the functions allocated to humans and automation. What this implies for function allocation methods is a need for richer, more detailed characterisation of work practice to inform decision making. A means by which designers can consider simultaneously, what McCarthy et al (1997) have referred to as the general and the particular. The general must be considered in order to achieve the appropriate level of abstraction but the particular must also be considered in order to make accurate comparisons of the effectiveness of different possible allocations on articulation work in practice. Understanding the ways in which technology and practice co-evolve also requires richer representations of work but these must allow designers to consider not only past and present practices but also how such practices might change in relation to yet-to-be-designed technology. This is much harder to achieve. In this section we review some recent approaches to function allocation that go some way to addressing these requirements. This is not intended to be an exhaustive review of function allocation methods. Rather it is intended to be representative and to serve to allow us to consider possible new directions.
Representing articulation work early in design
Within the HCI and CSCW research, there has been a move away from function-based design to scenario-based design (Carroll 1995, Greenbaum and Kyng 1991) . The nature of a 'scenario' is only loosely defined in the literature and different authors vary in the content and structure of scenarios used (Wright 1993) . However, the essence is that a scenario is a rich description of the work context as close to an actual observed instance of work as possible. Scenarios, it has been argued, offer the means of representing the concrete and the particular of work practice. and this volume) have explored the use of scenarios in function allocation. The approach identifies a set of scenarios that the required system might encounter given the initial specification of 'mission requirements'. The scenarios are constructed by considering incidents that have occurred with previous systems. The method assumes a 'technological baseline'. The baseline might be a proposed design for a future system, or may be an existing system. The method then examines what work would be required of the operator if the baseline system were placed in the scenario. This analysis may be informed both by designers' conjectures and by simulator studies. The decision process that follows the scenario analysis examines proposals for new automation by asking how the proposal might affect relevant parameters within the given scenario, and in the context of the technological baseline. The key point about this proposal is that the estimation of parameters is driven by an examination of the concrete details of the scenario, rather than functions in the abstract.
Dearden, Harrison, Wright & Gosling (1998) have also explored techniques which can allow designers to consider a level of function decomposition below that generally considered during early design. In this approach any proposal for automation to support a function is described in terms of four components; information, decision, action and supervision (IDA-S). Each component is then further decomposed into elements such as generating proposals, monitoring progress and revoking authority. The framework encourages designers to ask questions such as 'does the function depend on information gathered only through the automation, or does it rely on the human's monitoring aspects of the environment?' The answers to these questions help to identify some of the articulation work that may be required by the proposed system. For example, if data is to be collected by the human but the machine is to propose solutions, then some articulation work may be required to ensure the machine is able to take the human's information into account. Similarly, if the human is expected to identify exceptional conditions, then articulation work will be required in supervising the operation of the automation.
These methods have gone some way to helping designers to consider the details of work practice alongside abstract functional specifications. Both approaches require relatively modest changes to the way that systems engineers have traditionally set about function allocation. This has the advantage of making the techniques more acceptable to industry. However, such conservative change to design practice falls short of meeting some of the deeper challenges that studies of work practice pose for function allocation methods.
The methods described above support a richer representation of work context. But implicit in them is the view that a once-and-for-all allocation of function can be determined early in design. Yet the studies of work practice we have described highlight the way in which divisions of labour are often dynamically achieved. This observation suggests a need for methods of function allocation which support through automation, the dynamic divisions of labour observed in practice.
Supporting articulation with dynamic allocation of function
The central assumption of dynamic function allocation is that instead of determining function allocation a priori, before an occasion of use, why not design a flexible programme of automation in which the allocation is sensitive to each particular occasion of use? (e.g. Rencken and Durrant-Whyte 1993; Greenstein and Revesman 1986; Scallen, Hancock and Dudley 1996; Scerbo 1996) . This approach seems to offer the possibility of supporting working divisions of labour much more directly.
The concept of dynamic allocation of function is consistent with recently developed perspectives on human factors engineering in particular the approach termed cognitive systems engineering (Hollnagel and Woods 1983) . In this approach, complex systems are seen as joint cognitive systems in which automation is seen as a partially autonomous cognitive agent. This metaphor encourages us to view human and machines as epistemic equals in terms of their representational abilities. In a similar way, it has been argued that the goal of automation design ought to be to make intelligent systems team players (Malin et al. 1991) . Dynamic allocation of function is seen as central to this philosophy, and as we have seen in the studies of work practice, locally negotiated divisions of labour are a common characteristic of human teamwork.
Some initial successes have been reported in the design of machines that change function allocations in changing contexts. For example, Rencken and Durrant-Whyte (1993) report on a system that allocates object recognition and tracking tasks from a queue of multiple instances of such tasks to determine whether to allocate some of the tasks to the machine. Rencken and Durrant-Whyte's algorithm considers: the length of the queue; the human operators capacity to deal with the tasks, based on the operators performance in the previous time slice; the cost of changing the allocation; and a parameter representing the 'relative cost' of failure to deal with the task.
Rencken and Durant-Whyte's technique can be related to the dynamic allocation in ambulance control described by Martin, Bowers and Wastell (1997) mentioned in section 2. However, some caution is required when generalising from laboratory studies to complex work settings such as the ambulance control room. Rencken and Durrant-Whyte's computation relies on the 'relative cost' of failing to perform each task. In complex, tightly coupled systems it is extremely difficult to assign, a-priori, a value to such a parameter (Dearden and Harrison, 1996) . Case study one described in section 2.2, shows that the relative priority of tasks is highly dependent on contingent information, such as the specific altitude weight and airspeed at the time of the incident. The range of factors that must inform the allocation decision may be unknowable to the algorithm's designers. Martin, Bowers and Wastell (1997) describe a large number of contingent factors that can affect ambulance dispatch decisions and comment that the list of factors that they sought to construct showed no signs of terminating. They also note that some concepts of 'relative priority' in ambulance dispatch may be socially negotiated with callers and with ambulance crews. For example, dispatchers must consider the ambulance crews meal breaks when making dispatch decisions. This can lead to a situation in which "The severity of an overdue meal break -and hence its significance for the work of dispatch -is often argued out between Dispatchers and the crew themselves" (Martin, Bowers and Wastell, 1997, p.275) .
Such socially constructed factors in decision making are currently unavailable to machines. As Suchman (1987) has pointed out, there is a fundamental difference between the access that machines and people have to the moment-to-moment context of work practice. Even if outlouds and other mechanisms supporting co-ordination can be made explicit in the representations of work practice used by designers, the automation to support that practice cannot currently emulate these mechanisms.
Elsewhere (Dekker and Wright 1997) , we have illustrated the often fatal ways in which automation fails to represent enough of the work context to support dynamic function allocation. In one such accident, an aircraft overshot a runway when automatic braking and reverse thrust were not deployed on contact with the ground. Because of a wet runway and adverse weather conditions, the aircraft began to aquaplane. The braking automation required weight on both wheel assemblies and wheels to be spinning before the braking system could be activated automatically. These conditions were not met in this situation and consequently the automation did not recognise the aircraft was on the ground (Warsaw 1993; Mellor 1994) . In another such accident the aircraft failed to recognise the pilots' intention to land the aircraft and consequently attempted to carry out an emergency go-around procedure (Nagoya 1994) . The current technological limitations of automation mean that inevitably, such technology cannot always fit seamlessly into work practice.
Implications for function allocation methods and concepts
The studies of work practice described in section 2 together with the function allocation methods described in section 3, lead us to consider some implications for function allocation methods and concepts.
The need for richer representations
Most traditional function allocation methods take as input some functional description of the system to be designed and output task descriptions allocated to humans or machines or both. But studies of work practice point to the need for much richer representations of work if the subtleties of articulation work are to be factored into early function allocation decision making. Recent developments in function allocation have responded by taking scenarios as input to function allocation methods 1998; and this volume The flow model consists of a collection of user viewpoints on what information is used by the individuals and how work is co-ordinated between them. The flow modelling part of contextual design identifies the roles that people play and how these map to individuals. Analysis is carried out that relates to function allocation judgements such as identifying when too many roles are assigned to one person, when roles are split up between too many people and when the coordination overheads of working together become too great.
The cultural model captures the relations between individuals. Such relations may be power or political relations as well as emotional and personal. The nature, direction and extent of the influence of one individual upon another is indicated. The model is populated with quotes from workers expressing their attitudes and value judgements about others and about organisational facts including operating procedures. Thus the formal and informal aspects of the organisational culture are captured.
The sequence model captures the sequence of actions that need to be carried out in order to get work done. These represent work in terms of procedures and functions familiar to function allocation decision making but in addition, the sequence model indicates what triggers these functions and how they might be articulated.
The artefact model describes the information artefacts that are used in the course of doing the work, who has access to information presented in these artefacts and how the artefacts are used to co-ordinate flows. They way in which shared artefacts are used to achieve dynamic allocation of functions would be captured in this model.
The physical model captures the layout of the work space and the movement of individuals through it. Physical space often provides quite significant constraints on the nature and possibility of collaborative working including the dynamic allocation of function (Martin, Bowers and Wastell 1997) . The physical model highlights aspects of collaborative work such as over-hearing, informal-advice giving, opportunistic interactions and so on. It also highlights what artefacts are shared and by whom.
In the contextual design method, these five models are used as the basis for work re-design and a vision or concept of the future work system, including re-defined user roles and tasks and new technology to support these. Such multi-perspective views of work practice offer a rich source of information about articulation work and a means of generating scenarios. A function allocation method rooted in the ideas of contextual design would provide much richer representations of work practice for function allocation decision making.
The need to understand technology and practice as an evolutionary process
The co-evolution of technology and practice can occur as a human response to misfits between technology and practice. More generally it occurs as a consequence of the need to resolve dilemmas resulting from conflicting interests. Such resolutions may reflect concerns for reducing workload, or the need to get the job done, or concerns about the more social aspects of work of the sort described by Martin, Bowers and Wastell (1997) . Either way, this phenomenon limits our ability to foresee how technology will be used in practice and as a consequence, it limits the type of criteria that can be used for function allocation decision making early in design. It is not uncommon for example, for systems engineers and even human factors specialists to assume that workload, somehow defined, might be used to assess different function allocations options. Of course it is recognised that workload is inherently dependent on the context of use, but it is argued that if function allocation decision making is supported with rich representations of that context, such difficulties might be overcome. The phenomenon of co-evolution challenges this assumption by demonstrating that context changes over time in ways that are not captured by what might be called fixed-point representations of context. If such predictions were to be possible at all, the possible trajectories of co-evolution would need to be represented as part of the context.
An answer to the problem of designing for co-evolution does not currently exist. Before such methodological solutions can be found, we need a better understanding of the processes and mechanisms by which it occurs. In doing so, theories and models will need to make explicit the historical context within which technology is used in order to better understand the changes which occur over time and how these changes shape current practice. There have been many sociological studies of technology that take a historical perspective and point to how the meaning of technology changes not only has it is developed, but also as it moves through different communities. Bijker (1997) for example, describes the history of the development of bicycles. He shows that the development of the bicycle was shaped more by cultural and social circumstances than by technological capabilities. But more importantly, Bijker emphasises that the meaning given to a technology by communities evolves. Similar studies have been carried out by MacKenzie in systems engineering settings such as the development of inertial navigation systems (MacKenzie 1996) . These case studies provide valuable insights into evolutionary and social nature of technology development. However, they offer little in terms of practical analytical techniques. In HCI and CSCW research, consideration has been given to identifying theoretical frameworks that could not only provide a cultural and historical perspective but also be of practical use in design. One such theory is Activity Theory (Nardi 1996) .
In activity theory, tasks and functions are not the primary unit of analysis. Rather such functions are embedded into the context of an activity system. An activity system encompasses a context large enough to make of the work of individuals or groups. This may include people and communities, the objects of their work and the tools and artefacts that mediate between people and their work. Significantly for our current concerns with understanding change, Kuutti points out that such an activity system is not a static structure, rather it is under continuous change and development:
"This development is not linear or straightforward but uneven and discontinuous. This means that each activity also has a history of its own. Parts of older phases of activities often stay embedded in them as they develop, and historical analysis of the development is often needed in order to understand the current situation." (Kuutti 1996, p. 26) According to Activity Theory, one of the mechanisms for change is the existence of contradictions within an activity system or between activity systems (Hasu and Engström, in press) . As an example of the way in which contradictions manifest themselves in an activity system, consider the case described earlier of annotations to manuals documenting standard operating procedures (Wright, Pocock an d Fields 1998 , discussed in section 2.1). A contradiction exists between the manual as a tool for its owner and the rules laid down by a community of practice for using the manual. As a tool for the owner, work can be achieved more smoothly if the manual is customised to meet the owner's needs. From the point of view of the community, the work can be achieved more smoothly if every individual has the same documentation. One manifestation of this contradiction is the co-existence of an 'official' manual produced by the manufacturers and an 'unofficial' one through which pilots share experience.
It is not our intention here to propose Activity Theory as the answer to the problems of function allocation. Rather our intention is to show that attempts have been made to address the coevolution of technology and practice in theoretical terms. This might lead to improved function allocation methods, based on the activity as a unit of analysis, or it might just serve to characterise the fundamental limits of function allocation as a design activity.
Conclusions
This paper is not only about work practice it is also about representations. In particular, it is about how work practice is represented in that early part of design where decisions about who should do what in a system are made. Viewed in these terms, the message to be taken from studies of work practice is that not enough of the work context is represented during function allocation decision making. Gerson and Star (1986) made the following observation over ten years ago: "...without an understanding of articulation, the gap between requirements and the actual work process in the office will remain inaccessible to analysis. …When the articulation of the work is deleted from representations of that work, the resulting task descriptions can only be uneasily superimposed on the flow of work." (Gerson and Star 1986, p. 258.) Implicit in Gerson and Star's paper is an assumption which, for the purposes of exploring work practice and function allocation we have also made in this paper. The assumption is that it is possible to gain access to the details of practice in order to represent it and that such representation can be used in design work. This assumption was left unchallenged in this paper because we recognise a genuine need in the system engineering community for practical support with function allocation as an engineering problem. The aim of our research is to provide methods for function allocation that take account of work practices. But our assumption about representations of work needs to be treated with care if we are to avoid subverting such an aim.
Both Suchman (1995) and Robinson (1997) In system engineering, representations are viewed quite differently and are intended to stand in place of what it is they represent, in order that they can be transformed, refined and decomposed in a rational, deductive way. They are not intended to open-up dialogues, rather they are intended to close down options and to reduce the design space. The fact that representations of work are inevitably partial descriptions is seen not so much as a disadvantage but as an advantage. Like any abstractions, they reduce complexity.
In contrast to the systems engineering view, Contextual Design models, Activity Theory and scenarios support modes of working that are much more like Suchman's and Robinson's conception of design. What this suggests is that we need to support function allocation not only with richer descriptions of work but also with different ways of understanding how to use these descriptions in design practice. As McCarthy points out, used imaginatively such descriptions are a means of "referring back to answerable practice while imagining future technologies" (McCarthy 1998, p. 14) . But more than this, representations need not only to open up dialogues about design but also dialogues that continue as technologies move from design contexts into contexts of use.
